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PROSPECTS FOR AN INCREASED NAVAL ROLE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA IN NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY
This study shall assess the present and future situation faced
by the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy in an area and era — Northeast
Asia in the 1990s — which is widely considered dynamic. Pacific
dynamism is on the verge of becoming a cliched concept because it is
now so widely recognized. Precisely what that dynamism entails is,
however, far less well understood. Many on both sides of the Pacific
are intrigued by the possibilities and risks of a shift in power
relationships. Most evident to Americans are the tangible economic
changes occurring in US-Japanese relations. Comparable changes are
transpiring on a smaller scale in U.S. relations with the so-called
"new Japans." Americans tend to react to these shifts with some
ambiguity and trepidation, but also with a sense of equanimity
generated by the feeling that such changes are occurring within an
extended family of allies and trade partners. Though Paul Kennedy's
best selling The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers has drawn
considerable criticism, he at least helped raise a warning flag that
historical cycles and patterns may be valuable in terms of averting
fatalism and not succumbing to the inevitability of processes which
can be altered by appropriate policy adjustments. This aspect of
Pacific dynamism is crucial to the evolving Northeast Asian context
in which the ROK Navy operates. For better or worse, Northeast Asia
today is dominated by US-Japan interaction. For the foreseeable
future, this is likely to remain a constant of Northeast Asian affairs.
None of Japan's neighbors relish the prominence Tokyo once again
enjoys in Asian-Pacific affairs, least of all the Koreans, South or
North. 4 Nonetheless, this is a situation to which all parties seem
capable of adapting.
Much less obvious to most Americans are the superpower
shifts occurring in Asia. Mikhail Gorbachev's vaunted glasnost and
perestroika have caught the American public's attention in no
uncertain terms. Clearly there is popular fascination with the
processes of change and potentials for true reform in the Soviet
Union. The impact of those processes and potentials on Soviet policy
toward NATO and on Western European reactions to Moscow's policy
seem nearly as prominent in the popular consciousness of Americans.
The influence of Soviet domestic policy changes on Asia is, relative to
changes in US-Asian relations, much less noticed in the United States.
Normally only specialists in Asian affairs pay much attention to this
issue5 Precisely where the Gorbachev era in Asian affairs will lead is
impossible to predict. Some conservative analysts do not find such
estimation very difficult and warn against being deceived by a Soviet
peace offense. They detect no meaningful positive changes in Soviet
objectives in Asia, remind us that the Soviet bear still packs potent
claws, and argue that the United States and its allies must maintain a
high state of readiness to deter (and — if necessary — wage)
conflict. Such caution is warranted in the sense of worst case
assumptions. In these terms, Americans concerned with U.S. strategy
in the Pacific should heed voices of prudence and not get carried
away with their hopes that tensions will be so reduced that the Cold
War can be relegated to history. Nonetheless, Soviets in Asia are
speaking more pleasantly, behaving more politely, and suggesting
that their future actions will fulfill the promise of their
contemporary rhetoric. Those promises remain largely unfulfilled,
but more action has occurred (in Mongolia, Vietnam, and
Afghanistan) than most observers would have imaged feasible just a
couple of years ago. In short, Western prudence and pragmatism
notwithstanding, the Gorbachev era has introduced a second crucial
facet of dynamism in Asia that is paralleling the US-Japan facet.
China, and its great potential for change that could influence
not just regional — but global — affairs, also looms as a third facet of
dynamism. The Chinese factor is, however, not an imminently casual
one. China's impact almost certainly will be felt much more
gradually than the Japanese and Soviet factors. It is the US-USSR-
Japan triad which most seriously influences Pacific dynamism. This is
the contemporary context in which the ROK Navy contemplates its
options.
The ROK Navy: Domestic Context
When one considers the contemporary arms balance in Asia,
several states' forces loom large. Among them is the Republic of
Korea. Its armed forces have achieved warranted acclaim for their
professional development since the Korean War. They also have
earned considerable notoriety for their involvement in South Korean
politics. The Seoul governments produced by South Korean Army
elites — under Presidents Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were
well known for their harsh authoritarianism. They received much
foreign criticism in that regard. Fortunately, the current
government under President Roh Tae-woo « although also drawing
from a military elite — has achieved greatly enhanced political
legitimacy through seriously contested presidential and legislative
elections in 1987 and 1988.
Throughout the Park and Chun years it was extraordinarily
difficult for South Korean domestic critics of those regimes* military
roots to openly express their views about the political, economic, or
cultural roles of Army elites. As a result of the political upheaval
experienced in South Korea from the spring of 1987 through the
spring of 1988, which produced a de facto institutional revolution
and a rapid expansion in political pluralism, great strides have been
made toward real democracy. One dramatic result of this domestic
transformation of South Korea has been a remarkable increase in
freedom of the press and intellectual expression. This has unleashed
a wave of articles on formerly taboo or tightly controlled subjects.
Included in this surge of glasnost-like criticism were analyses of the
still-sensitive and delicate topic of the military's influence.^ Evident
in all this analyses is a new willingness to confront popular South
Korean antipathy toward the ROK military without cloaking it as
much in anti-foreign (Japanese or American) sentiments as was
common under Park and Chun. Anti-Americanism and anti-Japanese
sentiments flourished, too, in the new freedom but on their own
merits, not as a veneer for attacks on the military elites. In short, the
South Korean masses' longstanding doubts about the proper role of
the military in their culture, has gone public with a vengeance.
This has shaken thoroughly the once firm grip of the ROK Army on
political power.
It must never be forgotten, however, that those same armed
forces — now often maligned — are responsible for preserving the
security of South Korea and enabling that country to prosper
sufficiently so that it could sustain sizeable armed forces. In effect,
those successes were what provided the ROK with the time and
resiliency necessary to wage the political struggles that yielded the
reform-minded Roh Tae-woo government. All too easily forgotten, or
ignored, amid this tumultuous situation and intense emotion are the
various non-Army roles and missions played by the ROK armed
forces. Neither the ROK Air Force nor Navy have played major
political roles in their societies. The primary reasons for these
relatively minor political roles pertain to their sizes, military roles,
and budgets. Measured by all three criteria the ROK Army is
dominant. It is by the far the largest of the services with 542,000
personnel as of 1987. In comparison, the ROK Air Force only has
33,000 personnel and the ROK Navy only 29,000 personnel. 11 With
so large a share of the personnel pie, it is no surprise that the ROK
Army has the lion's share of the budget pie. Neither comparison
comes as any news to anyone remotely familiar with the security
situation on the Korean peninsula since the late 1940s. Neither are
Korean affairs specialists surprised by data which show the ROK
expends a large share of its GNP, and its budget, on defense versus
other social needs. 12 Ever since the formation of the Republic of
Korea in the south, and its rival Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) in the north, threat perceptions in the eyes of the Seoul
leadership have been overwhelmingly land-based and tangible. Few
in Seoul have been overly concerned about a North Korean air assault
and virtually no one has been fearful of South Korean subjugation by
North Korean naval assault. Whether security analysts focused on
deterrence or actually waging war, the name of the game in Korea
long has been army versus army.
Over the years that Army-orientation yielded some ground to
recognition that the ROK Air Force and Navy also play important
roles in South Korean security. That recognition grew apace with two
parallel developments. Firstly, numerical and technological
improvements in the North Korean Air Force and Navy, aided
especially by the Soviet Union in the mid-to-late 1980s, drew
attention to the heightened sophistication of the North Korean threat.
Secondly, massive growth in the South Korean economy during the
1960s, 70s and '80s enabled Seoul to greatly enlarge the defense
budget "pie," thereby facilitating more funds for the ROK Air Force
and Navy in absolute and relative terms. Throughout these decades
both the ROK Air Force and Navy have grown in capabilities and
professionalism. Of the two, however, the ROK Air Force's presence in
Korean and regional security affairs has become more evident.
Clearly lagging behind is the ROK Navy. Although its stature has
grown, that growth has not been so extensive as its sister services.
As important, the ROK Navy's image has changed least. It is still seen
as essentially a coastal navy with occasional big ideas about moving a
little bit off shore.
Most analyses of the Korean naval scene understandably focus
on the inter-Korean balance. 1 -* These analyses commonly, and
accurately, stress the gains South Korea has made in naval
equipment, training, and strategy as a result of the ROK's major
economic lead over the DPRK and because of much more harmonious
U.S. Navy and ROK Navy cooperation compared to the more uneven
relationships the DPRK Navy has had with its allies' navies. Though
contemporary security analysts, especially those from South Korea,
hasten to add that the ROK Navy still needs the U.S. Navy's support in
South Korea's defense, the common wisdom justifiably holds that
South Korea is increasingly able to hold its own against North Korea.
Certainly this is the prevailing view in ROK Navy circles. The focus
of this study is the ROK Navy's future strategic prospects, not its
present (or future) hardware, but published data on the balance of
naval forces provides a sense of the strengths and weaknesses of the
ROK compared to the DPRK. 15
On the face if it North Korea's Navy, formally called the "Navy
of the Korean People's Army," still appears to be superior to the
South Korean Navy. It has many more vessels and more personnel.
Moreover, North Korea has a formidable (in the Korean context) force
of out-date Romeo- and Whiskey-class submarines. North Korea also
has an edge in fast-attack categories and landing craft. North Korea's
assets are appropriate for its presumed missions, assaulting the
South. The ROK Navy's assets emphasize stymying such North Korean
objectives. The ROK Navy does not possess a submarine force
remotely comparable to North Korea's numbers. A debate has tugged
ROK Navy and defense planners in different directions for years.
Some in South Korea, hoping to keep up with the northern Kims, have
pressed for a ROK counterpart submarine force. In the face of
arguments that the ROK should not enter a arms contest of this sort
largely for prestige sake, and should focus on anti-submarine
warfare (ASW), leaving serious submarine activity to the U.S. Navy, a
compromise of sorts was struck. Rumors persist that the ROK Navy
contemplates purchasing French or German submarines, but such
speculation must be judged against the reality of South Korea's
indigenously produced submarine. Although essentially tilting in
favor of the ASW rationale, the ROK Navy also has developed, built,
and deployed three indigenous 175-ton submarines. These
submarines, called tolgorae (dolphin), engaged in a well-publicized
exercise in June 1987. There also have been press reports that the
ROK Navy bought two West German submarines in 1987. °
Overall, however, the contemporary ROK Navy clearly is
strongest when deployed to counter North Korean coastal incursions
and is developing added strengths in ASW capabilities. In doing so it
adheres to recent and past expectations. ' Consequently, the present
goals of the ROK Navy emphasize improvements on the margins of
what it now does. In other words, the working assumption of the ROK
Navy in 1988-89 is that it should strive to become a more capable
coastal navy, enhancing its ability to conduct ASW, provide
interdiction and coastal defense, and escort vessels aiding South
Korea's defense or constituting its logistics pipeline. These are roles
and missions that South Korea's economic and technological edge
over North Korea readily sustains. As important, they are roles and
* missions that are sellable to the ROK Army and Air Force because
they are compatible with the latter two services' view of Korean
security. In short, the ROK Navy's ongoing, and successful, efforts to
improve itself have been accepted because they are consistent with a
limited frame of reference. Professor J. K. Park succinctly expressed
the prevailing Korean view of such inherent constraints when he
wrote.
South Korea can never afford to overlook the
importance of the sea. But despite the importance
of the Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea, it cannot
allocate an extremely large portion of resources to
the naval force. They will have to contend for
resources with other military services as well as
civilian sectors of the economy.
There is no doubt that these constraints loom large in the eyes of the
ROK Navy and South Koreans who think about its place in their
country's security. In the various studies to which this analysis
subsequently will refer there are abundant references, explicit and
implicit, to these apparent limitations, but there also is a major — if
diffuse — effort to expand the horizons of naval thinking in South
Korea.
This has not been an easy task because of the strategy which
underlies South Korea's defenses. Partly because of Korea's
continental orientation historically, and partly because North Korean
ground and air forces pose the major threat, South Korea does not
possess a robust naval tradition. Unlike neighboring Japan, but akin
to China, Korea's culture has not esteemed the military's social
standing. Its few historical military heroes were overwhelmingly
from ground forces. There was only one truly notable naval figure in
Korea's martial pantheon, Admiral Yi Sun-shin, famous for disrupting
Japan's 16th century invasion of Korea. There is a beautiful shrine
(Hyon chung sa) to his memory in Onyang, which helps bolster the
naval tradition, but — on balance — Admiral Yi's legacy is much
greater as a focus of anti-Japanese patriotic resolve than as a naval
hero. Though the ROK Navy manfully tries to cultivate Korea's
historical naval tradition, it offers thin support upon which to
foster a broader vision of naval roles and missions. For better or
worse, most of Korea's scanty naval traditions are more appropriate
to a limited, off-shore-focused, naval image. Despite all these
inhibitions, there have been serious efforts to "think big" or at least
bigger than most observers deem practical. These efforts have
focused on raising new approaches to defense of sea lanes of
communications (SLOCs); new thinking about far off-shore waters
that South Korea shares with its neighbors (other than North Korea):
Japan, China, and the Soviet Union; Korean interpretations of legal
aspects of maritime issues; the industrial implications of increased
naval cooperation with allies; and forecasts of new directions in ROK
"maritime strategy." Each of these categories will be explored prior
to examining the impact they seem to be having on Seoul's policy.
SLQCDEBE^RS
Without question the issue of SLOC defense has gained great
visibility in South Korean security circles. The most centralized forum
for this issue is the SLOC Study Group, headquartered at Yonsei
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University where its Executive Director, Dr. Kim Dalchoong, is a
faculty member. The study group is composed of prominent South
Korean scholars, officials, and businessmen who share a common
concern with defense of sea lane security.20 Many of the studies
cited in this analysis were prepared by members of the study group
which is in the forefront of those in Korea who are pressing for new
visions regarding Korean security. A large number of the studies
done in Korea on SLOC security are basic examinations of what "SLOC"
means in the abstract and specifically for South Korea. Dr. Kim has
presented three successive evolutions of an analysis of South Korea's
seaborne trade and the SLOC issue which collectively show a
comprehensive grasp of the broad economic, political, and security
dimensions of important trade routes in the Western Pacific and
beyond, and how disruption of these trade routes might become as
serious a threat to the ROK's national well being as an assault by
North Korean forces.
Concurrent with Dr. Kim's 1982 analysis were three other basic
descriptive papers. One by Sogang University Professor Rhee Sang-
woo threats the same maritime framework as the Kim papers, but
does so with an firmer eye on the implications for South Korea's role
in collective security.22 Another by two professors at the Korean
National Defense College, Drs. Lee Sun-ho and Kim Young-hoon, was
published at almost the same time as the 1982 conference papers.
Their analysis, is more specific than those just cited. It attempts to
spell out what the authors think Seoul should have the ROK Navy do
in defense of off-shore sea lanes -- guarantee sea lane security
between major South Korean ports, develop appropriate bases on
Chaeju, Ullung, and Paekryong Islands, and increase cooperation
between the three Korean service branches to achieve the first two
goals. It also examines the prospect of the ROK playing a serious role
in "defense of the sea lanes on the high seas" by means of increased
cooperation with the United States and Japan. In addition, it responds
favorably, but cautiously, to conservative American proposals for the
creation of a sea lane protection arrangement that would include
Taiwan. The third study was by Commodore Kim Yon-shik (ROKN)
who also advocates a three-fold approach: bolster the storage of war
materiel; reinforce escort capabilities as a means toward building a
"sanitized" zone off-shore Korea in the key straits between the
peninsula and Japan, and the peninsula and Chejudo; and prepare to
assist the U.S. Navy by contributing two destroyers to a U.S. led
combined fleet composed of US, Japanese, and ROK vessels. An
additional contribution during this seminal period was the
conference luncheon speech presented by Dr. Min Kwan-shik which
underlined the linkage in the security arrangements the United
States has with South Korea and other regional actors and stressed
the importance of South Koreans not thinking excessively in
parochially Korean peninsula terms.
*
All those papers must be understood in the context of their
time. In the late 1970s - early 1980s time frame South Koreans were
experiencing a convergence of unsettling developments. Their
confidence in the United States commitment had been severely
shaken by the American reverses in Vietnam, the Carter
administration's maladroit efforts to cut U.S. forces levels in Korea,
and the growth of Soviet armed power (especially naval power) in
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the Asia-Pacific region. Although the Carter and Reagan
administrations took steps to reassure Seoul, the seeds of doubt had
been sown in fertile soil because many South Koreans harbored
longstanding concerns about the seriousness of the United States'
commitment to Korea. Part of the modern folklore of US-Korea
relations, created by late 19th and early 20th century U.S. policy
shifts and the ambiguousness of U.S. policy toward Korea in the late
1940s, is a pronounced skepticism among South Koreans about the
reliability of American promises. In short, there is a barely latent
readiness to not trust Americans. Compounding this sense of
uncertainty were the successive waves of "oil shocks" which jolted
the South Korean economy and made politicians, bureaucrats,
military officers, and businessmen hypersensitive to the reality that
their country, its economy, its raw materials, its exports, and its
military logistics pipeline are — all -- extraordinarily vulnerable to
seaborne disruption. In short, South Korean defense intellectuals and
policymakers were rapidly becoming sensitized to the fragility of the
economic and logistical infrastructure over which the ROK
government had minimal influence. They were beginning to ask what
good it would do to be able to protect themselves against North
Korea, and to work diligently in the private sector, if events far over
the horizon could prove as devastating. All of these considerations
were reinforcing factors to a growing number of South Koreans that
the concept of collective security had implications for the ROK well
beyond the context of the Korean peninsula.
In subsequent years other South Korean defense intellectuals
developed these ideas further. The year 1984 proved to be an
important one in Korea's concern over SLOCs. Although there had
been one previous attack on South Korean shipping in the Persian
Gulf (in 1982), that had seemed like a fluke event. In 1984, however,
two ROK merchant ships were attacked in the Gulf. This caused South
Korean businessmen and officials to become much more concerned
about sea lane security. As an issue, it was taken off the back burner
and became "hot" — the subject of serious debate by defense
intellectuals, officials, and (to a lesser extent) the media.26 There
are a number of notable examples. Kyung-hee University Professor
Kim Chan-kyu in 1984 explored the relationships between SLOC
defenses, maritime strategy in general, and how each fit into the
development of geopolitical theory — especially in an Asian
context. ' Such analysis may not be groundbreaking in the U.S.
context, but it made a valuable contribution to Korean understanding
of how the ROK's security is related to non-continental, maritime
security issues. Also in 1984 a ROK government researcher, Dr. Choi
Young of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Institute of Foreign Affairs
and National Security, examined what SLOC defense might require of
the ROK in the future and concluded that Northeast Asian security
would probably compel South Korea to cooperate at sea with the
United States and Japan. He also suggested that South Korean
concerns about the SLOCs in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean
would compel the ROK to seek naval cooperation from Australia, New
Zealand, and the Philippines. Dr. Choi, too, accepted the argument of
some conservative American analysts that naval cooperation with
Taiwan probably should be part of broader collective security
arrangements designed to defend SLOCs.28 Lastly, in 1984, Dr. Choi's
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Institute held a wide-ranging symposium that examined the
transitional security period the ROK was experiencing, the
importance of seaborne transportation to the ROK, and the
implications of these factors for Japanese-Korean military
29
cooperation.
In 1985 one of Korea's most insightful defense analysts, Dr. Cha
Young-koo of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses tackled, for
the SLOC Study Group, the relevance of SLOC defenses in a changing
world. He prudently called for much increased consultation among
allies concerned over the SLOCs so that collectively we might fashion
a coherent view of threat perceptions. Dr. Cha accurately noted the
enormous difficulty of defending SLOCs by any naval forces and
suggested fostering forums which might produce tension reduction,
thereby reducing or obviating the need to defend SLOCs. " Also in
1985 a senior Korean naval officer, Commodore Choi Deug-lim, offered
his analysis** 1 of SLOCs in a way that tailored the issue for several
long-standing ROK Navy goals: playing catch-up versus North Korea's
submarines and fleshing out the ROK Navy's coastal defense roles.
Reminiscent of the analysis by Professors Lee and Kim, Choi seeks
to enlarge the ROK's responsibilities for sea lane defense by
incremental upgrades from its existing peninsular focus. Commodore
Choi would develop "high seas corridors" in the Korean and Cheju
straits, coupled with enhanced ASW and mine-laying capabilities.
Looking toward the day when Korea can uphold a fair share of
mutual burdens at sea, Choi advocated major increases in ROK Navy
capabilities.
In 1986-87 the levels of analytical sophistication by Korean
scholars seemed to increase, presumably because they were building
upon the work that went before. For example, Dr. Rhee Sang-woo
expanded upon his earlier argument, 3 and advocated: working
toward a pact mandating non-aggression in the SLOCs (guaranteed
even in time of war), and -- as an interim measure to secure the
Northeast Asian SLOCs — pursue naval cooperation between the
United States, Japan, and South Korea. The latter would entail a joint
military command system modeled after the US-ROK Combined
Forces Command, a division of labor among the three countries in
accord with their capabilities, shared use of each other's bases,
cooperation in production and management of military equipment,
joint exercises, and sharing of SLOC-related intelligence. In June
1987 the SLOC Study Group held its most recent conference*^ which
contained two noteworthy Korean contributions. Dr. Chee Choung-il
prepared a fairly orthodox paper on the rationale for the ROK Navy
to enhance its coastal defense missions in a way that would be
integrated in SLOC defense concepts, but injected into his thesis two
provocative arguments about the unlikelihood of SLOC conflict in the
two war scenarios of most concern to South Korea. Firstly, he
observed, in the event of nuclear war, SLOC interdiction or trade
disruption are not likely to be of great concern to South Koreans in
such a catastrophic context. Secondly, in the event war in Korea
breaks out again, Dr. Chee assumes most expectations that the war
will be of short duration (i.e., about ten days) are accurate and that
such a war will not be long enough for disruption of supply lines to
matter very much.-*" In a somewhat similar vein Dr. Lee Seo-hang, a
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Senior Research Fellow at the Korean Ocean Research and
Development Institute, argues that the SLOCs vulnerability — while
crucial to the ROK — is also crucial to all sorts of other states,
including the Soviet Union. He further argues that arrangements
should be pursued that will assure that the SLOCs will not be
disrupted by any party. '
What has been the impact of all this argumentation? It would
be inaccurate to make sweepingly positive judgements about the
impact. The ROK Navy does not yet have a mandate to assume major
new defense roles. On the other hand, however, progress has been
made in getting national recognition of the importance of naval
defenses. Some of this no doubt was stimulated by the increases in
Soviet-North Korean armed cooperation in the mid-to-late 1980s
which certainly sensitized Seoul to the potential direct threat the
USSR could pose to the ROK and reinforced Seoul's fears of
Pyongyang-Moscow machinations. A great deal of that motivation
was ameliorated by the appearance of improved Soviet policy toward
Asia since the Gorbachev era began. Regardless of the ephemeral
qualities of such South Korean concerns, they did help to promote a
new sensitivity to the sorts of maritime security interests discussed
in all the studies assessed here. One result of this ongoing process
was the pronouncement by then President Chun in April 1987 that
sea lane defense was "vital" to ROK security and economic well being,
and that the importance of the ROK Navy to South Korean security
"cannot be overemphasized. ° This marked a change of tone, at the
very least.
18
New Thinking About Northeast Asian Security
In no area has there been more "thinking big" than in
contemporary South Korea's prospective security relations with its
three large neighbors: Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. Each will
be examined here, but in a very different light. As is indicated in the
previous section, Japan enters into much of the thinking that occurs
in South Korea about its future security. To put it mildly, there are
many South Koreans who are nervous about what Japan may do in
the future about its national security, how it may choose to approach
regional security, what sort of impact the changing roles of the two
superpowers may have on the strategic thinking going on in
contemporary Japan, and the ways in which resurgent Japanese
nationalism could influence these matters. Some of this South Korean
concern can be chalked up to longstanding paranoia among some
Koreans whose view of Japan was indelibly warped by their
horrendous experiences under Japanese colonialism. Although their
emotional fears are understandable, they rarely are based on an
effort to be objective about contemporary Japan's security interests
and policies. Fortunately, there are a large cadre of scholars,
government officials, and businessmen whose professions require
them to focus on the real Japan — not one visualized in the popular
imagination shaped by the bitter legacy of colonialism. By and large
these individuals develop an accurate sense for what Japan's
interests and policies really are. Unfortunately (from a U.S. or
Japanese perspective), such South Koreans, too, often remain
concerned about Japan's security prospects and options. Their
informed concerns revolve around the uncertainties enveloping
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Tokyo's security policy. They tend to be wary of Japan's true
commitment to its relatively benign "comprehensive security"
doctrine, ^ uneasy about the United States' confidence in — and
emphasis upon — Japan as a security partner, anxiety-ridden about
the prospect that Washington will share so many burdens with
Tokyo that the Japanese will end up running the security
arrangements in Northeast Asia, and very ambiguous about Japan's
relatively more flexible foreign relations with the Soviet Union,
China, and North Korea. In short, few South Koreans trust Japan to
hew to the path it has carved out for itself in the postwar era under
the auspices of the United States. They much prefer to keep Japan
constrained by the de facto leash formed by the US-Japan security
relationship.
Such South Koreans have spoken and written extensively about
the pros and cons of the ROK-Japan security environment and the
ways in which it has been influenced by the three other major
powers, especially the United States. There are many analyses of the
prospects for a triangular US-Japan-ROK security relationship. The
great majority of those analyses are critical of that prospect and
warn South Koreans to be extraordinarily cautious about being
trapped by Washington and Tokyo into an arrangement considered
to be widely unpopular in South Korea. u Political leaders, too,
recognize that this is not an issue around which there is any ground
swell of support. Many prominent Seoul leaders have disavowed the
entire approach to regional security 41 Nonetheless, there is a clear
trend emergent among South Korean defense intellectuals that some
variant of trilateralism may be desirable under certain
circumstances. That trend encompasses views that treat prospective
ROK-Japan security cooperation more broadly than naval-related
42
issues, but here the focus shall remain on Korean views of the
prospective naval component.
The naval aspect of Northeast security, and its bearing on
Japanese policy, was made vivid for South Koreans by the 1983
decision of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to assume a larger role
in Japan's self-defense that would entail the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) protecting the key navigable straits that link the main
Japanese islands together, and to the Korean peninsula and the Soviet
Union. Tokyo's intentions to use its navy, the Maritime SDF (MSDF), to
control those straits by blockades drew major attention in the Korean
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press and stimulated ROK naval interest in precisely what the
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Japanese were up to off Korean shores. Both the Japanese and
Koreans have a cultural predilection to view foreign problems as
very foreign until brought home to them in an intrusive manner.
This is what Koreans call "fire in another's house" (nam ui jib ui bul)
and Japanese call "fires on a distant shore" (kaigan no kasai ). In the
case of the strait between the Korean peninsula and Kyushu, the
maritime stakes of the ROK and Japan are inextricably intertwined.
Threats to that body of water (the Korean strait/Tsushima strait) are
phenomena that both Korea and Japan must confront. As long as
Japan did nothing serious to cope with potential threats, and left
those responsibilities to the U.S. Navy, the ROK could afford to be
cavalier about its own interests and options. Seoul merely assumed
that the United States would cope without the help of allies. The
pressures the United States exerted on Japan to assume more naval
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responsibilities (i.e., the much vaunted plans to protect a thousand
miles of sea lanes) produced results that took many South Koreans
relatively unawares. An estimate of what Japan has accomplished
and contemplates doing regarding Korean security will be offered in
a subsequent section, but for now it can be noted that the
achievements in Japan's defenses — especially the growth of the
MSDF -- made a pronounced impression on many South Korean
defense intellectuals, policymakers, and citizens concerned with ROK
security.
Like it or not, many such South Koreans recognized that the
conditions off-shore near the peninsula would be massively
influenced by Tokyo's maritime policies. Simply put, these Koreans
decided the ROK would have to respond and offered suggestions on
how to do so. There were, of course, new warnings along the old lines
about becoming gratuitously entangled in US-Japan naval matters
that should be left beyond South Korean purview. All the analysis
that emanated from North Korea strongly and vociferously reinforced
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those warnings. Nonetheless, there were some strikingly forward
looking analyses and policy moves during the mid-to-late 1980s.
Facilitated by the smoother relations brought about the by the 1983-
84 exchange of visits by President Chun and Prime Minister
Nakasone, and the semi-apology of Emperor Hirohito for Japan's
colonial excesses, small scale ROK-Japan naval cooperation began.
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Exchanges of fleet visits was agreed upon in mid-1985. More
important, the two Asian navies expanded their participation in
exercises with the United States in ways that overlapped in a
functional sense. They also, of necessity, had to engage in so-called
"pass-ex" (passing exercises) cooperation. These may be small steps,
but as both nations' philosophical tradition advises them, that is how
one starts long journeys.
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One 1984 paper cited previously by Dr. Lee Ki-taek, pointed
in that direction. Although he noted all the orthodox disclaimers
about the unlikelihood of near-term Japan-ROK cooperation to defend
the sea-lanes, and cautioned South Korea about the impact moves in
that direction could have on the United States' willingness to keep its
existing commitments to the ROK, he also acknowledged as
"inevitable" future direct bilateral military cooperation at sea
because of Japan's certain role in maintaining sea-lane security in
Northeast Asia which is, in turn, "vital" for South Korea. Dr. Lee
recognized the differences in Japan and the ROK's threat environment
and advocated a larger role for Seoul in consultation with Tokyo and
Washington over regional security, cautioning that it would be better
for Seoul to participate in such consultations than to stay out of them
and leave it to the United States and Japan to devise a strategy which
would directly effect Korea's security. Dr. Lee is a professor at a
mainstream university (Yonsei) giving his views broader credibility.
Others who have staked out affirmative positions on the
potential for Japan playing a positive role in maritime security
around or near Korea have had more conservative institutional
affiliations. For example, in 1986 Commander Jung Chang-shik (ROKN)
— after making the obligatory cautionary remarks about Japan
getting out of control militarily and politically, the U.S. proving a
fickle partner, and (somewhat contradicting his apprehension about
Japan becoming too powerful) Japan abstaining from conflict in or
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near Korea -- argues for an innovative approach. First, he
explained in detail what Japan's SLOC defense plans might mean for
ROK maritime security. Based on that, his approach is three-tiered.
He advocates a significant expansion of the ROK Navy, making it — in
the near term — unilaterally capable of protecting SLOCs close to
Korea, but with a longer term objectives of creating a much larger
"blue water" navy. He further argues that the ROK should seek
indirect and secret naval cooperation with Japan to protect the
broader SLOCs under the leadership of the United States. Finally,
Commander Jung argues that this attenuated naval triangle with two
strong and visible legs and one (ROK-Japan) leg that is viable but not
so obvious should be capable of being transformed into a trilateral
cooperative system in time of war, providing joint capability to
protect the sea-lanes. Also in 1986 a much more conservative
researcher, Dr. Kang Byung-kyu (a Board Member of the
"International Security Council," a spin-off of the Rev. Moon Sun-
myung's organization), offered an articulate argument for the ROK
cooperating closely with the United States and Japan to protect Asian
49SLOCs. Though his arguments are likely to appeal to many
Americans, Japanese, and South Korean conservatives, his
institutional ties do not bolster what is otherwise a worthwhile
argument and that argument, in turn, is not appreciably helped by
being identified with very conservative causes.
More in the conservative mainstream again were two 1987
analyses. National Defense College professor Lee Mang-sug also
raises other obligatory cautionary notes about Japan being
vulnerable to North Korean spying, the danger of the ROK becoming
too dependent on Japanese military technology and information, and
the risks that the U.S. might use Japan-ROK military cooperation as a
pretext to cut its commitments, perhaps egged on by the increased
North Korean criticism likely to emerge from closer Japan-ROK
cooperation. On balance, however, Dr. Lee favors a gradual increase
in quasi-military cooperation between South Korea and Japan,
leading to real military cooperation as the ROK's national power
becomes sufficient to not be vulnerable to Japanese advantages. The
other analysis was far more provocative than the others. Commander
Lee Chang-geun (ROKN) wrote that the ROK should expand its navy
to avoid "inferiority." He suggested this larger navy could be ready to
cooperate with presently friendly states against contemporary
adversaries, but also should be prepared to cope with states that also
could become "potential enemies," i.e., China and Japan. His new
approaches, however, focused on cultivating naval cooperation
between the ROK, the United States, and Japan, to include routine
naval exercises. Commander Lee also pressed for a changed US-ROK
naval relationship, calling for the integration of the ROK Navy into a
cooperative relationship with the U.S. Seventh Fleet through a joint
command system, the establishment of a Seventh Fleet base in Korea,
and expanded regional interaction based on such a reinforced US-
Korea naval system.
There is little doubt that much new thinking has occurred in
South Korea regarding the possibility of closer military/naval
cooperation between the ROK and Japan. The old shiboleths about the
impossibility of such bilateral cooperation no longer so automatically
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apply in the Korean context. The Japanese context will be surveyed
below. For all that progress, however, it must be emphasized that
there is still a deep reservoir of suspicion in Korea about Japan when
it comes to security issues. There is no rush to embrace Japan too
closely. Such an embrace is somewhat more comfortable when the
United States also links arms. There is a very strong desire even
among South Koreans who support closer naval (and other military)
cooperation with Japan to retain the United States as a buffer.
Complicating this entire situation is the emergence of two other
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major trends in ROK perceptions of the world. Since 1984 the ROK
openly has been experimenting with flexible relations with
communist countries, other than North Korea. Prior to that there had
long been reports of covert or indirect ROK trade contacts with a
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variety of communist states Initially this open move was a
transparent ploy to undermine North Korea's position in the contest
the two Korean states were waging. As the 1980s progressed,
however, the economic advantages of these steps quickly became
evident.
Not even events like the 1983 Soviet attack on KAL 007 or the
North Korean bombing in Rangoon were able to seriously impede
Seoul's desires — bolstered by the 1988 Olympic spirit — to expand
its diplomatic and trade horizons. Smaller scale examples of this
trend are evident in ROK overtures toward various Eastern European
states and Vietnam. Perhaps the foremost success of that subset of
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relationships was the growth of ROK-Hungarian trade relations. Far
more significant for the overall directions of ROK foreign and security
policy were the initiatives Seoul has taken regarding the People's
2Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. Once implacable
adversaries and critics of the ROK, and steadfast supporters of the
DPRK, both Beijing and Moscow have mellowed toward Seoul under
Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev. ROK ties with the PRC once
were spoken of only in hushed tones lest North Korea react so
adversely that the fledgling relations be upset. Made possible by the
normalization of US-PRC diplomatic relations, the partial convergence
of US-PRC strategies which yielded significant complementarity of
interests, changes in China's worldview and economic priorities, and
a sense among South Koreans that they, too, might get a share of the
"great China market," ROK-PRC contacts have blossomed. Nudged on
strongly from behind the scenes by business leaders such as the
Daewoo Group's Kim Woo-Choong, bilateral trade has grown from
1985 estimates that ranged from $300 million to $800 million to
1988 estimates of $3 billion which is about six times the estimate for
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trade between China and North Korea.
The main impact of that growing trade relationship has been on
the overall diplomatic and security tenor of ROK-PRC relations which
are clearly improved, despite a concentrated effort by Beijing to
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maintain its ties with North Korea. There is no sign that Seoul is
insensitive to the utility for ROK policy of the PRC maintaining a dual
policy toward the divided Korean nation. Seoul is being eminently
pragmatic in this regard. Its pragmatism is most glaring in regard to
the once solid ROK relationships with the "Republic of China on
Taiwan," which have been adversely influenced by improved ROK-
PRC ties. This shift has more than symbolic importance because it has
a direct impact on ROK naval options in the Western Pacific. Despite
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the sympathy some South Korean analysts discussed here have
displayed for conservative American analysts' suggestions that
Taiwan be incorporated into any future non-communist sea-lane
defense alliance, the ROK is moving in diplomatic and economic
directions that are antithetical to such proposals. Contemporary
Seoul-Taipei relations are not good, and specifically there have been
negative repercussions on ROK-Taiwan naval interaction symbolized
by Taipei's veto of the Taiwanese navy's plans to buy more than $1
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billion worth of frigates from South Korean shipyards. More than
any other factor, however, there seems to be an overriding private
sector impetus behind many of the ROK foreign policy shifts toward
communist/socialist states which is dramatically different in nature
from the anti-communist geopolitical motive which for so long drove
Seoul's leaders. Commercial drives now seem to have reached a
significant level of parity with once dominant security drives.
In no area is this more evident than in South Korea's policy
toward the Soviet Union. The ROK long has been somewhat
ambivalent toward the USSR. Seoul treated the Soviet Union as an
adversary because of the ways it backed North Korea, it was the
clear adversary of South Korea's essential ally in the Cold War, and it
was the ideological fount of a belief system most South Koreans
learned to abhor. As the ROK's global trade interests grew, South
Koreans also became sensitive to the threats that a growing Soviet
Navy might pose to narrow ROK sea-lane security interests and to the
much broader network of interests expressed by South Korea's trade
partners. On balance, however, the prevailing attitude among
concerned South Koreans long seemed to be that such problems are
best left to the superpowers and that the United States can cope
alone. At the same time as years of U.S. pressure for "burden-
sharing" and "cost-sharing" seem to be bearing some fruit worldwide
(including Korea), a countervailing tendency emerged as a result of
affirmative South Korean responses to Moscow's overtures to Asia in
the Gorbachev era.
These are not truly surprising, despite the public indications of
South Korean animosity toward the USSR. South Koreans' ambiguity
toward Russians is partly historical, in the sense of memories of
Czarist Russia's supposedly better intentions toward Korea than
many other Westerners (including Americans) and of conveniently
short memories about how much responsibility each superpower
should bear for Korea's postwar division. As important, there are
some South Korean scholarly and official observers of world affairs
who think the Soviet Union pays more attention to Korean issues
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than the United States does and resent this perceived situation.
All these feelings, compounded by the emotions of radical anti-
Americanism and pro-Soviet sentiment during the 1988 Seoul
Olympics, have made it easier for Seoul to open up to Moscow in
pursuit of reduced tensions and improved economic relations. Moves
in this direction are not new. They can be traced back to open
expressions of interest in the late 1970s. By 1983 then Foreign
Minister Lee Bum-suk was able to announce the ROK's adoption of a
"Nordpolitik" policy toward the Soviet Union and other communist
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states, signaling Seoul's flexibility. The Gorbachev era in Moscow
seemed to unleash Seoul's willingness to be flexible regarding the
Soviet Union. By 1987 Seoul openly proclaimed its intention to
29
pursue improved ROK-USSR ties to counterbalance what the then
Foreign Minister Choi Kwang-soo described as improved US-North
Korean ties. The Olympics accelerated these processes greatly,
producing in October 1988 an agreement to exchange formal trade
offices between Moscow and Seoul. Earlier in 1988 Japanese
sources suggested that ROK-USSR trade was nearly $1 billion per
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year.
Soviet objectives in this regard are not difficult to discern.
Moscow wants trade, access to technology, and anything that might
weaken the ROK's ties with allies or friends which do not suit Soviet
purposes. In short, the Soviet Union hopes to get from South Korea
approximately what it hopes to get from Japan, merely on a smaller
scale. If one were to base one's estimate of the Soviet Union
achieving such goals vis-a-vis South Korea on the last forty years of
ROK history with the USSR, the probability would be very low to nil.
There is, however, one trait in the tradition of Korea's foreign
relations which is reason not to make such a facile judgment. There is
a tendency toward love-hate bonds. One can see that in Korea's past
and present ties with China, Japan and the United States. Some
Koreans fawn over their protector-benefactor while others castigate
them for their toadyism.
This big-power phenomenon is called "flunkeyism" (sadaejui ).
In its negative aspects, it suggests too much willingness to find
Korea's identity and stature only by basking in the radiance of
another power's greatness. Individual Koreans who are accused of
such obsequious behavior are criticized for seeking the approval
(real or apparent) of foreign leaders by making a hat-in-hand trip to
their big power's capital. South Koreans in the past accused
Pyongyang's leaders of behaving this way toward Moscow and/or
Beijing. North Koreans, and South Korean critics of Seoul's military-
backed governments, have often accused South Korean leaders of
doing this toward Washington in order to gain some legitimacy.
Those styles of behavior are relatively well known. What is different
in contemporary South Korea is a rush to make the "trip'' to Beijing or
Moscow so as to show that one is on the new wave of foreign
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relations. Some of this is mere infatuation with trendy and faddish
politics and economics, but beneath that veneer is the possibility of
something more profound. If Seoul continues along the foreign policy
path it now trods, and receives sufficient rewards for the ROK's
improved relations with China and the Soviet Union, there is a real
chance that some of the sadaejui behavior will be transferred to
Beijing and Moscow. This is a potentially destabilizing factor.
In addition to Seoul's changing views of communist states —
the primary new trend in South Korea's worldview — it also appears
to be shifting a bit in its views of Japan. For most of the postwar era
the ROK has put some distance between itself and the Japanese when
it comes to security affairs. Seoul is fond of reminding Americans of
how close — in contrast to Japan — the ROK's security instincts are to
those of the United States, how much more reliable the ROK is as an
ally, and how much more willing the ROK is to spend money on
defense. South Korean leaders often seem to consider themselves
virtually ideal allies, while the Japanese are denigrated as waffling,
wimpish, and spendthrift. Many Americans, while being careful not
to offend the Japanese, appreciated what their South Korean friends
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were saying. This is illustrated well by the American attitudes
toward the comparative forthcomingness of South Koreans versus
Japanese on burdensharing issues when one compares the potentials
of each society to contribute to mutual security.
Over the years, however, there has been a subtle shift in South
Korean attitudes. There does not seem to be the same degree of
readiness to put down Japan. Instead, there seems to be an
appreciation that Seoul's willingness to criticize the Japanese
proclivity to be out of step with its allies and the rest of the world —
or to march to the beat of a different drummer — may have been a
misjudgment. As the United States and the Soviet Union move
toward revaluation of their defense and budget priorities, many
Japanese are comforted by the sense that the superpowers may start
to get into step with Japan, rather than the other way around.
Watching these possible changes, South Koreans are no longer so
quick to disparage what Japan has done. Though on a much smaller
scale, one can detect parallels between recent ROK foreign policy
changes and Japan's past and present flexibility, recent ROK
international economic programs and Japan's precedents, and --
perhaps most radical — Seoul's new caution about defense spending,
a grudging respect for Japanese relatively low defense spending (as a
percentage of GNP), and the advantages this provides to the Japanese
economy. South Koreans are not very open about any of these views,
but they are evident between the lines.
Legal Aspects of Maritime Issues
This is an area where a handful of South Korean scholars have
done some careful work that lays the foundation for a broader ROK
interest in the seas and their defense. A leading specialist in this area
is Dr. Park Choon-ho, of Korea University's College of Law, who wrote
several important analyses in the early 1980s coinciding with the
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growth of South Korean concern over maritime security. Other
notable scholars also contributed to this literature, including the late
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Dr. Hahm Byong-choon. All these early works are notable for their
caution, stressing to South Koreans that the ROK should have its legal
homework done before it proceeds very far in proclaiming the rights
to defend, or lay claims to, maritime transportation routes and
resources. The latter became more important to Seoul as its concerns
with seabed mining and oil exploration on the continental shelf grew
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in the early 1980s. There have been numerous legal studies
throughout the 1980s pertaining to these issues, fleshing out ROK
interests. By 1988 such studies had become more specific in nature,
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asserting strong ROK interests off-shore.
On balance, these studies do not advance precise strategic goals
of the ROK in maritime areas, but they do put those goals on a
steadier course and give them enhanced intellectual credibility in
Korean society where legal scholarship enjoy great esteem (despite
the fact that the political culture is not a legalistic one). It is
significant that the ROK Navy chose for the organizer and Director of
its Center for Maritime Strategic Study (Haegun Daehak Haevang
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Junryag Yunguso ^ one of its own legal scholars already cited here, Dr.
Kim Young-Koo. Starting from scratch this competent officer, with
solid academic credentials in legal studies, was tasked with creating a
vehicle for educating ROK Navy officers in the subtleties of naval
strategy, not merely tactics. This is a formidable assignment, but it
seems to have been entrusted to a person capable of fulfilling it. As
important, it signifies the seriousness with which the ROK Navy is
approaching the creation of a larger force manned by officers who
will know what to do with a meaningful navy when they have it.
Whether this is a measure of their farsightedness or simply
unwarranted optimism remains to be seen, but the odds seem to
favor the former.
ROK Naval Growth and South Korean Industry
Essential to the prospects for ROK Naval growth is an industrial
base capable of supporting an enlarged navy. There are four levels at
which this is important. The most profound and pervasive is the
relationship between the overall industrial base and the ROK's
maritime needs and security. As one of the postwar era's most
famous economic success stories, the ROK now possesses a world-
class industrial base. It, in turn, is heavily dependent on shipping to
and from Korea of raw materials and finished goods. Because of the
ROK's location at the tip of a peninsula, and the lack of continental
access to the north because of frictions with the DPRK, South Korea is
for all practical purposes as much an island as the Japanese islands.
The South Korean economy and its logistics network are almost
totally dependent on seaborne transport. This dependency and
vulnerability underlies the South Korean recognition emphasized
previously in this study that the ROK now is a maritime country and
must think and act like one.
The second and third levels of analysis are related to South
Korea's consciousness of its maritime-oriented industries: shipping
and ship-building. South Korea's shipping industry has a mixed track
record. The ROK government (like most) treats the South Korean
merchant marine as an adjunct to its security apparatus. At times it
has been a strong backer of various shipping companies, has guided
the composition of the merchant marine fleet to regulate competition
(though the 1983 Sea Transportation Nationalization Plan fHaeun
Sanup Hapri Hwa Keiwhoekl and protects it as a vital industry for a
still developing country with maritime vulnerabilities. The shipping
industry grew rapidly in the 1970s, probably too quickly, leading to
major debts and the acquisition of many poor quality vessels from
abroad. As of late 1987 the ROK merchant marine had 436 ships. The
ROK also faced pressures from abroad (including the United States) to
allow foreign shipping competition within South Korea, not just for
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foreign products. Cumulatively, this led to major business
problems which subsequently contributed to well known scandals
that helped shake the political power structure in 1987. The South
Korean ship-building industry also confronted certain economic
problems related to the companies' heavy debt-burden, expensive
financing, relatively low productivity, and foreign competition.
Despite all that, there are expectations in South Korea that the 1990s
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will be profitable. Compared to the shipping industry, however,
South Korea's ship-builders are doing better.
There are four major ship-builders in South Korea, which
account for about 94 percent of the ships built there. They are in
rank order: Hyundai Shipbuilding, Daewoo Shipbuilding, Samsung
Shipbuilding, and Chosun Shipbuilding and Engineering. While Korean
shipyards were a commercial presence (significant in the Far East) as
far back as the 1940s, they did not become a major factor in global
shipbuilding until the 1970s when the ROK's overall economic boom,
and Seoul's encouragement of shipbuilding as one leg of the heavy
industrial portion of that boom, propelled South Korean ship-building
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toward the center of the world stage, rivaling Japan. During 1988
the big three (Hyundai, Daewoo, and Samsung) experienced a variety
of labor problems and customer complaints. These, plus accumulated
economic problems, were severe enough in Daewoo's case to warrant
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a move to rescue it by Seoul. The government's motivation for
helping such companies is exactly the same as it was when it initially
reinforced them in their growth stage: they are closely related to
national security. There is a real danger that Korea's shipbuilders
could be outpaced by up-and-coming competition. Though still a
relatively young industry in Korea, without adequate nurturing these
firms could face tough times ahead. Addressing those times leads to
the fourth level of analysis.
In contemporary South Korea there is a concerted effort being
made to ingratiate and integrate the ROK defense industrial base
with their counterpart industries in the United States. South Korea's
defense industries got their first major boost from the frictions
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between the United States and ROK in the mid-to-late 1970s, during
the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the aborted Carter
administration troop cutback effort in Korea. Both events shook the
Park government, already nervous about the United States because
of political and human rights pressures. One result of these frictions
was the emergence of high level South Korean doubts about the
durability of the United States commitment to Korea, the reliability
of American promises, and the wisdom of depending on the United
States as South Korea's main defense materiel supplier. After behind
the scenes wrangling, Seoul essentially opted for a three-fold
posture. It decided to retain its overt interdependent relationship
with the United States, but supplement it slightly by other foreign
purchases (i.e., hedging the ROK's interdependence) and, in a major
way, by cultivating a substantial interdependent domestic arms
production capability.
Most of that endeavor concerned equipment for the ROK Army
and Air Force, but the shipyards had their role in support of
indigenous supplies for the ROK Navy. Since the mid-1980s there
have been many examples of South Korean suggestions that the ROK
can be a major defense industrial asset for the non-communist world,
and especially for the United States, by functioning as an arsenal for
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Asia. Some have gone further and suggested that the ROK should
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be counted as part of the United States' arsenal. Seoul clearly is
pushing these arrangements for the commercial, technological, and
strategic benefits that will accrue to the ROK if it can foster a truly
tight bilateral bond, sufficient to wed the United States so firmly to
South Korea that Koreans need no longer be seriously concerned
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about the possibility that American will prove fickle again and
confirm their worst expectations. There is little doubt that the ROK
would like to broaden any cooperative defense industrial
arrangements it can devise with the United States to include a major
role for its shipyards in support of the U.S. Navy and other allied
Asian (or other) navies.
The massive ROK shipyards are capable — in theory — of
building or repairing anything that floats if they have access to the
technology and materials. Some of the largest vessels in the world
have been built or repaired in South Korea. It is only logical,
therefore, for South Korea to want to help sustain its shipbuilding
industry through contracts for its own naval expansion and by
offering their repair services for U.S. and allied navies. Though made
somewhat problematic by South Korean interest in Soviet inquiries
about a joint venture in shipbuilding, it is conceivable that the
facilities in Ulsan (Hyundai) and on Kirjae Island (Daewoo and
Samsung) might become as crucial to allied security in the Pacific as
Subic Bay and Sasebo now are. Should the latter become politically
less tenable, South Korean facilities might loom still larger. This
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prospect has appeal to the ROK as an approach to burden-sharing,
as an economic asset, as a way to help ensure the United States will
remain committed to Northeast Asian maritime security, and as a
way to enhance the economies of scale and technology sharing that
will enable the ROK Navy to create larger forces. After all if the ROK
is able to provide ship repair and supply facilities on a par with
Japan, has access to the technologies necessary to deal with virtually
all categories of naval vessels, and develops the experience required
to instill confidence in its ability to sustain a major naval fleet, what
would prevent Seoul from harnessing that know-how to its
aspirations for a larger navy? Given the right combination of
conditions and aspirations -- internationally, economically, and
strategically — the ROK Navy could use the South Korean industrial
base as a platform to launch a major growth phase.
New Directions for the ROK Navy
The ROK Navy seems to be dealing with the future on two
levels. Within the parameters of its accepted coastal defense roles
and, by extension, missions to defend those portions of the SLOCs and
straits which are near Korea, it is engaged in a gradual, but relatively
small scale, increase in its forces and projected goals for their use.
This approach appears to be eminently feasible, facing no
insurmountable obstacles. On another, more innovative level, there is
broader thinking going on about what the ROK Navy might do in the
future. Some of this thinking is in response to U.S. analysts
speculation about such roles, including some of the author's previous
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work. There is a small risk that such analysis will contribute to
South Korean thinking and, in turn, be unknowingly reacted to by the
same group of U.S. analysts. This could become cyclical and self-
fulfilling. There is, however, little real danger of this because South
Korean analysts are too knowledgeable about the diversity of
American viewpoints to be misled by a mere handful. Most American
analysts of Korean affairs are sufficiently familiar with the Korean
scene not to be similarly misled by only listening to the views of
39
those South Koreans who agree with US positions. More important,
there are larger factors in ROK political, economic, and security
calculations than the opinions or desires of Americans.
ROK policies are driven by those factors, not by US-ROK
relations. So, as long as U.S. analysts and policymakers are aware of
the pitfalls of rereading their own views regurgitated for American
consumption, there is minimal risk of being deceived by South
Korean new thinking about broader ROK security goals. Some of this
new thinking about potential ROK naval roles really seems to be a
recycling of what most observers hope is "old thinking." Because of
the probability that another Korean War (or, more accurately, a new
outbreak in the long stalemated 1950s Korean War) would wreak
unacceptable levels of destruction on both Koreas, there is a
widespread hope that the leadership in Seoul and Pyongyang will
consider such hostilities almost literally unthinkable. The economic
achievements of both Koreas would be devastated in such a war. The
nuclear and superpower ramifications of it also are widely assumed
to be major factors contributing to the reasons both sides in Korea
should not seek war. Collectively, all this contributes to deterrence.
It is natural that military officers and security officials should
speculate about improvements in war-fighting capabilities. Such
speculation is widespread in the ROK armed forces. Equally
widespread is a degree of rhetoric about defeating North Korea and
rescuing the North Koreans from their bitter fate. Similar sentiments
in the North are voiced about the ROK. Most of that is chalked up by
outside observers as bravado necessary to keep the morale of the
forces high. Every now and then, however, one hears wishful
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thinking, hoping for the day that South Korea will enjoy so much
superiority that the opponent cannot conceivably wage an effective
defense. One can hear such views in US-Soviet relations, too, where
they are a virtual impossibility. Consequently, they can be either
dismissed entirely or relegated to extremist circles. Similar
assumptions operate regarding North Korean views of that sort.
South Korea, however, might actually achieve great superiority over
the North in the not too distant future. This keeps "march north"
thoughts alive in some South Korean circles that should know better,
and gives Americans reason for concern.
In any event, there are sentiments of that sort in South Korea
which occasionally find expression in naval matters by analysts who
want a stronger ROK Navy so that it will be part of the
overwhelmingly superior forces capable of subduing the North and
contributing to unification by force of arms. In short, such analyses
want the ROK Navy to be more offensive oriented, capable of
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retaliating and taking the battle to the North Korean enemy.
Though done by respected analysts, these studies seem to have taken
a leaf out of the U.S. "Maritime Strategy" and adapted it to long
standing South Korean desires to take the battle to the enemy and go
on the offensive instead of being so passive in defense and
deterrence. Planning and implementing the means toward such roles
also is feasible in the South Korean context. It may well happen in
the 1990s, but prudence dictates that it not go beyond the planning
and creating equipment stage. Actually, foregoing a deterrence-based
strategy versus North Korea would be an incredibly risky notion.
Fortunately, there is not much sign that this variant of "new
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thinking" is spreading very far, but it should be watched closely in
case it spreads.
Much more interesting, and less risky, are those who
contemplate what the global shifts in power between the United
States, the USSR, China, and Japan may mean for the ROK Navy. There
are many South Korean scholars and officials interested in the
former, but relatively few who make the connections with the ROK
Navy. Fortunately, those who do, have shown considerable insight
and appear to be in positions where their influence will be felt. For
example, Dr. Park Jae-kyu, President of Kyungnam University and
well connected to Seoul political elites, suggests that the importance
of South Korea's maritime identity will be recognized by the ROK as
the global power balance shifts, simultaneously making the major
powers less capable of controlling the security of the seas and South
Korea more capable of lending a greater hand in maritime
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defenses. Another prime example is the initial effort by the head
of the ROK Navy's Center for Maritime Strategic Study to define what
South Korea's "Maritime Strategy" means in contrast to a generic
maritime strategy globally and in Asia, to the John Lehman version
in the United States, and to the specific naval postures of South
Korea's neighbors. Though preliminary, it shows an understanding of
the forces at work in and around Korea which could reshape the ROK
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Navy in the next couple of decades.
Perhaps the most balanced, yet forward looking, South Korean
assessment of the ROK Navy is contained in a conference paper on
US-ROK Navy interaction by an up-and-coming ROK Navy officer, Dr.
(Capt.) Cho Doug-woon, while attached to ROK Navy Headquarters. Dr.
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Cho notes, inter alia, that the ROK Navy "needs to grow from the
present coastal defense posture vis-a-vis [the North Korean Navy]
into a blue water navy capable of protecting its own SLOC." He
further notes, "A bigger share in defense investment cake needs to
be allotted for naval force acquisition toward a stronger, blue-water
navy. Such a quest is the biggest task that the ROKN leadership
faces." (sic) Dr. Cho also includes many caveats about South Korean
economic, political, and security constraints evidently to be sure that
he does not lead Americans astray or to calm South Korea's
neighbors' apprehensions about any such grandiose new thinking.
Nonetheless, his ideas do seem reflective of the new ROK Navy
leadership generation's thinking about where their service should try
to go in the future. Precisely what the ROK Navy leadership may be
thinking should be more clear by the summer of 1989 because the
ROK Navy plans to host its first major open conference in July (co-
sponsored by the SLOC-Study Group, Korea) entitled "The First
International Sea Power Symposium." The preliminary planning for
this conference indicates it will be an influential gathering which
could help shape the course the ROK Navy will pursue in the
future.
ROK-Japan Naval Interaction
It is impossible to assess the future of the ROK Navy in
Northeast Asian security affairs without also addressing the naval
status and prospects of the other U.S. ally in the region: Japan. This
study is not about the MSDF, of course, so only brief attention will be
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paid to its contemporary status except in the ways that it relates to
Korea and security issues that are important to the ROK. The same
applies to prospects for the MSDF. In addition to those themes, this
portion of this study shall address what a cross- section of Japanese
have been saying in recent years about either Korean security or
related issues.
The Japanese MSDF is a very different organization from the
ROK Navy. To begin with it is not a "navy," as its name connotes.
Legally Japan does not have armed forces but "self-defense" forces.
For some in Japan this is merely a euphemism. Certainly many SDF
personnel feel a sense of duty and tradition that is in keeping with
Japan's long martial legacy. That sense probably is strongest in the
MSDF which benefits from a very strong naval heritage.
Consequently, there are two basic -- and very perverse --
differences between the MSDF and the ROK Navy: one is a navy with
a relatively short history and fragile tradition, the other is a quasi-
navy with a long history and proud tradition that helps maintain its
esprit. Others perversities abound. The ROK Navy exists in a society
that generally recognizes an imminent threat, is strongly committed
to national defense, and spends a large share of available resources
on defense yet knows its role is low on the nation's list of security
priorities. The MSDF, on the other hand, exists in a society that is not
very sensitive to external threat perceptions, does not feel very
endangered, and tries to keep defense spending as low as it can get
away with, yet it finds itself ranked fairly high on Japan's list of
security priorities.
The ROK Navy does not get nearly as much attention or respect
in South Korea as the MSDF does in Japan. Consequently, the
contemporary ROK Navy can only hope to attain the size and
capabilities of the JMSDF. The list of ironies goes on. United States
pressures on Tokyo to develop its SDF to defend Japan and cooperate
with the United States in Japan's defense, have been reluctantly
accepted by most Japanese. They generally are not enthused about
such burdensharing. Many are uncertain about the wisdom of the
entire security relationship with the United States, doubt it will make
8 8
Japan more secure, and oppose serious burdensharing.
Nevertheless, the MSDF — partly under U.S. pressure and guidance —
has created formidable forces that are fully capable of playing a
major role in Japan's defense and, under certain circumstances, could
play a role in the defense of Japanese interests further afield.
The MSDF, like the other branches of Japan's services,
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sometimes is viewed as weak. This is a misconception. Americans
who criticize Japan for not doing enough often overstate or misstate
their case, not giving Japan full credit for what it has accomplished.
While there is room for complaints regarding Japan's relatively small
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goals, it generally has met its goals and — in the process — has
created forces that are very sizeable. Whether they are sufficient for
Japan's present and future needs is another matter, but today they
are significant. That certainly is true of the MSDF. While this is not
the place to engage in bean counting of the MSDF, or to engage in a
detailed assessment of those "beans," it is worth comparing gross
figures cross-nationally. Japan is likely in 1989 to meet its 1985-89
mid-term plans, giving it 62 major surface combatants This is up in
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numbers (and quality) from 35 about ten years ago. To put that
number in a meaningful context, it is more than the U.S. 7th fleet. It
also is more than the combined major surface combatants of both
Koreas (the ROK and the DPRK), Taiwan, the PRC, India, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia.
Of course, such comparisons are somewhat misleading because the
MSDF does not have the diversity of either the 7th Fleet or that
combination of Asian-Pacific navies. The MSDF's greatest assets are
in ASW. The point here is not to make the MSDF appear to be a
bogeyman, but to note how much the Japanese have achieved in
their "navy" without a major national commitment of will, money, or
budgetary efficiency.
Were that commitment to be made by Tokyo, there is little
doubt that the MSDF — presumably renamed a Navy — could readily
be transformed into a force to be reckoned with by any potential
adversary in Asia or, for that matter, globally. The MSDF already has
a solid track record in submarines (16) which enjoy a good
reputation. They act as a force multiplier for the MSDF. Furthermore,
there are persistent rumors that the MSDF aspires to small carriers,
probably for VSTOL (vertical take-off and landing) aircraft. While the
author was lecturing throughout Japan for the U.S. Information
Agency in July 1988 about prospects for US-Japan defense
cooperation, one frequent question from audiences was why the
United States was preventing Japan from building whatever weapons
systems it might want -- including aircraft carriers and nuclear
systems. That misperception aside, there clearly is some popular
interest in Japan about such defense alternatives.
The chances of Japan pursuing such options in the short-run
are not high because Tokyo does not see any need, but over the
longer run — as conditions at home and abroad change — it is
impossible to be so sanguine. National pride and altered threat
perceptions could nudge Japan toward creating a still more
significant naval force. Unlike the ROK case, all Tokyo needs to do is
make the decision. Though ROK Navy personnel would never admit it
(for reasons of their own national pride), they are very likely
envious of what the MSDF now has, can do, and could develop if
Tokyo had the desire. In short, the MSDF — even with a fairly limited
strategic mandate and no formal ability to engage in collective
security — has the wherewithal to do what the ROK Navy can only
dream about. Rubbing this in still more, the MSDF's ASW and
submarine capabilities are vital parts of the Northeast Asian SLOC
defenses on which U.S.-R.O.K. security depend and of which the ROK
Navy would like to become a greater part.
Moving on to what some in Japan have said about the
importance of Korea-related security issues to the defense of Japan,
there has been remarkable candor. Starting in the early 1980s the
Japanese government became a bit blunter about the potential threat
9 1
North Korea might pose to Japan. Tokyo also was
uncharacteristically blunt in 1983 about its willingness to consider
blockading the straits between Japan and Korea and to mine areas to
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stop Soviet submarines. These were the sorts of Japanese views
that contributed so greatly to an increased South Korean awareness
of the ROK maritime security concerns in Northeast Asian affairs
which might be shaped by Tokyo's defense policy. In addition, there
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were a number of Japanese analyses presented that more specifically
addressed the naval aspects of Korea-related security which are
93
important to Japan. Some were translated into Korean, but that
usually is not necessary for South Korean defense analysts because
many have a solid command of Japanese and/or English giving them
ready access to what is written about Korea by Japanese and
Westerners. Consequently, the writings of Japanese analysts are
frequently noted by South Korean defense specialists.
South Korean analysts are well aware that their Japanese
counterparts often speak out on much broader security issues that
94
are well beyond the narrow confines of Japanese "self-defense."
Less frequent, but more pointed from a Korean vantage point, are
those Japanese who speak out on Korean or Korea-related security
issues. This is an emotional area in both Japan and Korea, because of
the colonial legacy, but fairly strong views are nonetheless
expressed. In 1983, when SLOC defenses became more sensitive in
both countries, Kitamura Kenichi, of the Japan Center for Strategic
Study, wrote a tough-minded analysis of the significance of maritime
threats to Japan and noted "the defense of a line connecting Japanese
islands and the Southern half of Korean peninsula is the key to the
security not only of the SLOC in the Pacific basin but also of East Asia
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as a whole." (sic) Another analyst from the same center, Oga
Ryohei, pointed out explicitly one way that Japan's cooperation with
the United States in the defense of the Tsushima strait contributes to
South Korean naval security vis-a-vis North Korea. Oga correctly
noted that North Korea is compelled to divide its naval power
between its Yellow Sea and Eastern Sea fleets because Pyongyang
must expect to be denied transit access around the tip of the
peninsula. Consequently, the ROK's naval security is enhanced by the
proximity of US-Japan naval interaction focused on the Soviet Union.
Oga suggested "the operation to secure SLOCs to Japan will be borne
by Japan and Korea," but did not specify how they might be
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accomplished. In more recent years, other Japanese have been
much more explicit in recommending far closer and direct ROK-Japan
naval cooperation. Among them are Diet member, Horie Masao; a
former Japanese Military Attache to the ROK, Lt. General Tsukamoto
Katsuichi (GSDF, Ret.); a former Chief of Maritime Staff, Admiral
Yoshida Manabu (MSDF, Ret.); and Vice Admiral Hozumi Toshihiko
(MSDF, Ret.).97
Such Japanese views strike a responsive chord among some
Americans and South Koreans who think Japan should show more
willingness to cooperate in collective security. Even a cursory review
of these Japanese writings, however, indicates that they are
considerably to the right of the center-left mainstream of Japanese
society's security orientation. There may be enormous logic behind
such views, but it is not a logic that the majority of Japanese share.
Even these conservative analysts are careful to note the constraints
that operate in Japanese society which are likely to inhibit Japan-ROK
naval cooperation, or any other forms of security interaction. This
does not necessarily mean that advocates of such cooperation in the
ROK, Japan, or the United States must cease their advocacy as a lost
cause, but they must recognize the hurdles in the way and try to
address them in ways that have some appreciation for the diversity
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of views in all three states. Even in their private views Japanese
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conservative analysts — who have considerable sympathy for South
Korea's predicament, and for the parallels between ROK and Japanese
maritime interests — are extremely cautious about the constraints
which they think will prevent Japan from going very far or very fast
99
toward Japanese regional security cooperation.
South Korean analysts seem to cultivate conservative Japanese
views, but also are very well aware that they are hearing a minority
viewpoint. As much as the ROK appears to like the conservative
approach from Japanese defense analysts, there seems to be a strong
degree of ambiguity about such Japanese that -- prudently and
wisely — leads most South Korean analysts to avoid falling for the
enticement of harmonious rhetoric from Japan. On balance, South
Korean analysts are sufficiently apprehensive about Japan and
cognizant of where the mainstream of Japanese security thinking
flows, to understand that enhanced bilateral naval cooperation
almost certainly will be a slow and tenuous process. It is not
impossible for the Japanese anymore than it is for the South Koreans,
but both seem set to make haste slowly
Policy Implications for the ROK
The Republic of Korea's primary security concern remains, and
is likely to remain for the short- to mid-term, focused on the threat
from North Korea. Consequently, anything which reinforces that
threat also magnifies its significance to Seoul. Prior to Gorbachev's
more moderate policy pronouncements regarding Asia, and
specifically South Korea, there was a major surge in South Korean
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concern about burgeoning DPRK-USSR military cooperation. That
concern seemed to peak in 1985 when reports were publicized about
Soviet submarines at North Korean bases and elements of the
Soviet Pacific Fleet visiting the North Korean port of Wonsan with
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much ballyhooing of the event by Pyongyang. In subsequent
years the cultivation of Soviet-North Korean naval ties by Moscow
and Pyongyang, exemplified by a July 1986 ceremonial visit by a
flotilla of the Navy of the Korean People's Army to Vladivostok
(commemorating the 25th Anniversary of the Soviet-DPRK security
treaty) and a May 1987 visit to Pyongyang by Admiral Vladimir
Chernavin (Soviet vice minister of defense and head of the Soviet
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Navy), continued to cause concern in Seoul. Considerable anxiety
persists in the ROK leadership about the purposes of enhanced USSR-
DPRK security cooperation, but the post-Olympics improvement in
ROK-USSR relations seems to have mitigated much of Seoul's
nervousness. For years South Korean official rhetoric about the
dangers of the "bear" in the backyard of the ROK and Japan strongly
empathized with the views of the United States. Throughout most of
those years, however, the rhetoric had no possibility of being
translated into policy actions because the ROK lacked the
wherewithal and most South Koreans — including diehard anti-
communists — did not consider their country capable of doing
anything to help the United States versus the Soviet Union that
would be of serious value to the ROK's American allies. All that
changed in a significant way as a result of U.S. pressures for
Northeast Asian burdensharing and a growing sense of confidence on
the part of ROK officials that South Korea actually might be able to
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lend a hand in a meaningful way. Such considerations produced the
growing interest in SLOC defenses and other regional security issues
which already have been described in this study.
Contemporary ROK officials are, indeed, more capable,
interested, and enthusiastic about dong more for their own defenses
and to cooperate with the United States in regional security. They
also might be ready to explore certain types of indirect security
interaction with Japan as long as the United States remains an
intermediary and does not attempt to dump responsibility for
Northeast Asian security upon the Japanese. Were the Soviet Union
still led by a Breshnev, Andropov, or Chernenko, there is every
reason to believe that South Korea would be firmly on a course
leading to greatly enhanced regional security cooperation with its
main ally and that ally's friends and other allies. This course may yet
be followed, but the policy pronouncements of the Gorbachev
government appears to be causing serious hesitation in Seoul. Most
South Koreans — like many others in the non-communist world —
are inclined to wait for Moscow's rhetoric to be fulfilled by verifiable
actions before embracing the "new" Soviet Union. They, too, are
cautious and prudent. In the process of waiting, however, Seoul is
exploring its foreign policy options in a much more fundamental way
than the ROK ever has in its forty year history.
Many South Koreans are hoping that the relatively progressive
economic proposals raised by Gorbachev in his 1986 Vladivostok
speech, and subsequent elaborations, will bear fruit. Similarly, they
hope that Soviet force cutback proposals in Europe will be echoed in
Asia. They also hope that Soviet efforts to put a more benign facade
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on its Pacific fleet by declaring it "defensive," and to stress that
an economically active Soviet Union has as much interest in freedom
of the seas as other Pacific countries, will be borne out by concrete
Soviet steps. All of this, of course, remains to be seen. Like
Americans many South Koreans harbor a healthy skepticism about
Gorbachev's ability to deliver on such promises, or — perhaps —
remain in office long enough to assure that they will not be reversed.
In the mean time, however, they are in no rush to do anything that
might provide the USSR with a pretext to not pursue such policies.
Seoul also harbors hopes that a more friendly and peacefully
engaged Soviet Union might play a positive role in tension reduction
in and around the Korean peninsula that could improve the prospects
for peaceful unification of Korea. The net result of all these concerns
and hopes is a sense of ambiguity and policy limbo.
Contemporary South Korea is not as certain of where it is
heading internationally as it was in the early- to mid-1980s. Its
horizons have been broadened considerably by changes in US-USSR
relations in the second Reagan administration, greatly improved ROK
relations with the PRC and USSR, and the on-again/off-again gains in
the ROK-DPRK dialogue. Those foreign policy horizons also are being
recast by the emergence of the ROK as a major actor in global
economic affairs, and by the emergence of the Japan-centered Pacific
trading block as a powerful factor in international affairs. This is a
heady period for the ROK. South Korean pride and confidence are in
rapid ascendence. Simultaneously, however, certain verities in
previous ROK experience are being questioned — namely the long-
term durability of the United States in its regional roles associated
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with Japan and the Philippines. US-ROK trade frictions also inject
new uncertainties for Seoul. Compounding these uncertainties are
much longer term questions about the future role of Japan in Asia
economically, politically and militarily. Many South Koreans wonder
how Japan will react to the perceived "decline" of the United States.
It is one thing for South Koreans to be the "little brother" of
Americans from far away, it would be entirely different if the ROK
ever had to face the reality of becoming the "little brother" of Japan
once more in order to preserve its security. With such diverse and
erratic considerations, hopes, and fears being influenced almost daily
by rapidly shifting circumstances, it is no surprise that Seoul is wary.
How does all this effect the prospects for the ROK Navy? Its
responses seem likely to be opportunity-dependent. If the ROK Navy
is destined to remain an expanded coastal force, its understandably
modest contemporary goals are entirely appropriate. As important,
they are fully feasible. Because there is a small but significant chance
that the ROK Navy will be influenced by domestic new thinking and
by nationalistic pressures stemming from South Korea's hubris, its
leaders are likely to contemplate what they would have to do in
order to make a serious contribution to SLOC defenses, to aim at the
creation of a "blue water" navy (one of only a handful worldwide), to
create a national mandate necessary to carve out a share of the ROK
defense budget commensurate with such grandiose goals, and —
simultaneously — to devise a national strategy that would be
appropriate to such ends. Neither separately nor collectively are
these simple objectives. Should the Gorbachev era produce tangible
reductions in superpower and regional tensions, all such thoughts
might be obviated. Since the latter is not likely to happen quickly —
if at all — there is reason to think the ROK Navy may indeed think
big.
In that light, there are several key factors which probably will
help the ROK Navy make a stronger case for a larger national role
and appropriate capabilities. The combination of relatively reduced
United States naval influence in Asian security and an increased role
for the Japanese MSDF, is likely to strengthen ROK Navy arguments
that South Korea cannot afford to lag too far behind. Those
arguments are likely to be buttressed by a navy's ability to "show
the flag" in ways armies and air forces cannot. Partly a reality and
partly a pretext, such symbolism is likely to be influential in a South
Korea which increasingly must come to grips with its maritime role
in the world. Whether or not inter-Korean and regional Northeast
Asian tensions are reduced, this expression of increased national
power and prestige may remain attractive. If the ROK economy
continues to grow rapidly, as is widely expected, Seoul will have the
financial resources enabling it to build a truly larger navy, and even
more reason to be proud of its economy and the navy that economy
might build to help ensure economic security. Though some
movement in that direction could be considered a mere sop to
American pressures for increased burdensharing, there seems to be
ample reason for the ROK to pursue such goals for indigenous
rationales.
South Korean security encompasses two basic options: should it
remain essentially ground-based and continental in nature or should
it explore its maritime options? Common wisdom holds that
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continentalism will prevail because of the Korean nation's division.
Even if Korea were united as one state, most analysts assume it
would remain continentalist. Perhaps so; history certainly suggests
this will be the case. There is, however, no logical reason why the
ROK (or some future unified Korean state) would not attempt to
follow both strategies. Almost certainly Korea will seek to retain
sufficient ground and air forces for its territorial security. That,
however, is not likely to be sufficient for providing real security for a
wealthy nation which is so heavily engaged in global trade. In that
sense there is an excellent chance that the ROK will, over time,
develop a view of its security which closely parallels that of Japan
and that it will assign much more value to the diverse contributions
naval forces can make to national defense and deterrence. Should
that occur, one can expect to witness the growth of the ROK Navy
well beyond the coastal roles and missions usually assumed to be its
fate.
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